Key Cases
Under Florida law, Section 440.185(1) provides:
An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall advise his or her employer of the injury within 30 days after the date of or initial manifestation of the injury. Failure to so advise the employer shall bar a petition under this chapter unless:
(a) The employer or the employer’s agent had actual knowledge of the injury;
(b) The cause of the injury could not be identified without a medical opinion and the employee advised the employer within 30 days after obtaining a medical opinion indicating that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment;
(c) The employer did not put its employees on notice of the requirements of this section by posting notice pursuant to s. 440.055; or
(d) Exceptional circumstances, outside the scope of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) justify such failure.
In the event of death arising out of and in the course of employment, the requirements of this subsection shall be satisfied by the employee’s agent or estate. Documents prepared by counsel in connection with litigation, including but not limited to notices of appearance, petitions, motions, or complaints, shall not constitute notice for purposes of this section.
Here’s a look at how Florida courts have interpreted this notice rule:
Alfonso v. Mac Dinton’s Restaurant, 515 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). An employer testified at the hearing before the deputy commissioner that on the day of the accident he heard claimant exclaim from the freezer in which the injury occurred that she had hit her arm on the freezer’s rack. The employer further indicated that he asked claimant if she was all right and that she replied she thought so. The court held that these facts indicated that the employer was amply supplied with “knowledge” of claimant’s injury sufficient to comply with the notice provision of section 440.185(1)(a). It is unnecessary for an accident to have occurred in the direct view of the employer in order for the notice provision of section 440.185(1)(a) to be invoked, and that the provisions of the statute are satisfied whenever the employer becomes reasonably aware of the accident as did the employer here when he heard claimant scream from the cooler that she had hurt her arm.
Marion County v. Futch, 983 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Section 440.185(1)(a) does not define the term actual knowledge; however, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as “direct and clear knowledge or knowledge of such information as would lead a reasonable person to inquire further.” The record in this case did not contain evidence that either supervisor present at the scene witnessed the claimant’s accident. Furthermore, the record clearly established that the claimant failed to immediately report his accident and injury to the supervisors present at the scene or to any other reporting officer within the 30-day reporting period. Thus, the JCC did not have competent, substantial evidence to find that the E/C had actual knowledge of the accident.
Gregory v. Crum Staffing, 3 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Claimant’s supervisor witnessed the accident, heard Claimant say something about being hurt, and learned Claimant had been to the doctor less than thirty days after the accident. Thus, there was nothing constructive about the E/C’s knowledge that an accident occurred, nor that Claimant experienced some sort of injury. This was sufficient to satisfy the “actual knowledge” requirement in section 440.185(1)(a).
Davis v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 196 So. 3d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). By its plain language, subsection 440.185(1) does not apply to subsequent accidents because the injuries sustained in those accidents do not “arise out of and in the course of employment.” Because subsection 440.092(5) is silent on any reporting requirement, we must look to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2012) (requiring generally that petition be filed within two years of date of accident or one year from date of indemnity payment or furnishing of medical treatment), for guidance as to the time limits for filing petitions for benefits.
Peters v. Armellini Exp. Lines, 527 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Claimant testified that he felt a twinge in his back on November 19, 1986, while unloading boxes of flowers from a truck. Claimant testified that his pain worsened each day until he was forced to go to the emergency room at the hospital, approximately ten days after the date that he felt the initial twinge in his back. At that time, bed rest and medications were prescribed. Claimant was seen by a physician on December 8, 1986, and December 19, 1986, at which time further bed rest and medications were prescribed. Medical records introduced into evidence indicate that claimant again saw his physician two times in January, once in February, three times in March and once in April. Clearly, claimant has made a conscientious effort to alleviate his pain through prescribed bed rest and medications. The unrefuted testimony in the record indicates that claimant notified his employer of his injury sometime in January of 1987. Claimant testified that he did not notify his employer before that time because he did not believe his back was “going to be — as damaged as it was.” The court found claimant acted reasonably under the circumstances in not notifying his employer of his injury within the statutory time period.
Practice Point
The strongest notice defenses typically arise when neither the employer nor its agents had contemporaneous knowledge of an injury and the employee cannot explain a delayed report. Conversely, where a supervisor witnesses an accident, observes signs of injury, or learns of medical treatment shortly thereafter, Florida courts have shown a willingness to find compliance with the actual-knowledge exception even in the absence of formal notice.
