Case File
A Vermont plaintiff who received workers’ compensation benefits argued that jurors should have been informed of both the benefits and his obligation to reimburse them from any recovery. The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the trial court properly instructed jurors not to speculate about workers’ compensation coverage.
Case
Tiedemann v. Wheeler, No. 25-AP-322 (Vt. 07/17/26)
What Happened?
A FedEx courier was injured while delivering a package to a home. The courier sued the residents of the home, alleging in part that he was injured due to their negligence. Specifically, the courier slipped on a whiteboard on the ground that had blended in with snow but would have been “noticeably different than the surrounding area.”
The jury awarded $59,372 in economic damages and $5,000 in noneconomic damages. After the application of comparative negligence and the addition of prejudgment interest and costs, the final judgment totaled $59,239.99.
The courier filed several post-verdict motions, including a motion for a new trial, arguing, in part that the court should have instructed the jury about the workers’ compensation benefits he received.
In particular, the courier asserted that the court’s “instruction on insurance may also have contributed to the jury’s confusion and division.” The instruction told the jury not to speculate about whether the parties had insurance to cover any damages or whether plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The jury was instructed that their “job is to award the amount of damages that you determine has been established by all the evidence presented to you.”
According to the courier, this charge, “without more, left the jury to assume … that [he] somehow had insurance coverage for his `damages’ and could collect from that insurance.”
The courier argued that the court should have given his proposed instruction which acknowledged plaintiff’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits and informed the jury it should not consider that information in its deliberations “because [the courier] has a legal obligation to repay all such workers’ compensation benefits paid to him from any award.”
The courier also took issue with defense counsel’s reference to the standard in a workers’ compensation case in her closing argument, which the trial court found “ill-advised” but did not warrant a new trial as “it was so oblique that any prejudicial effect was minimal.”
The court found no basis to disturb its earlier ruling and denied the motion.
The courier appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.
Rule of Law
Under Vermont’s collateral source principles, juries generally should not consider a plaintiff’s receipt of insurance or workers’ compensation benefits when determining damages. Evidence concerning such benefits is ordinarily excluded because it may improperly influence the jury’s assessment of liability or damages.
What the Vermont Supreme Court Said
According to the Vermont Supreme Court the trial court did not err in rejecting the courier’s argument that the court’s instruction about insurance and opposing counsel’s statement in closing as to the standard for receiving workers’ compensation benefits created juror discord about collateral benefits and contributed to a compromise verdict. The court agreed that the isolated reference to the workers’ compensation standard was too indirect to have materially affected the verdict.
Instead, the court “provided a reasoned basis for its decision” in the Vermont Supreme Court’s view.
The Vermont Supreme Court reasoned that informing jurors about workers’ compensation payment, even alongside a reimbursement explanation, would improperly inject collateral-source evidence into the case and risk influencing the damages determination
“The fact that [the courier] disagrees with the court’s conclusion does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion,” the court wrote, citing Meyncke v. Meyncke, 980 A. 2d 799 (Vt. 2009).
Verdict: The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Takeaway
Vermont courts remain reluctant to allow juries in third-party negligence actions to hear evidence that an injured worker received workers’ compensation benefits, even when the worker seeks to explain a reimbursement obligation. This decision reinforces the general rule that collateral-source information should be excluded unless a compelling reason exists to place it before the jury.
